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ABSTRACT 
 
ESTIMATING CONSUMER SURPLUS IN eBay COMPUTER MONITOR  
AUCTIONS 
 
 
Giray, Tuğba 
M.A., Department of Economics 
 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Kevin Hasker 
 
 
January 2006 
 
 In this study, using data from computer monitor auctions on eBay collected in 
2000, bidding functions are estimated by maximum likelihood using five different 
assumptions about the underlying distribution of independent private values. It is 
assumed that these values come from the logistic, gamma, weibull, pareto and 
lognormal distributions. Next, consumer surplus in the market for computer monitors 
is estimated and its sensitivity to different distributional specifications is tested. Two 
types of consumer surplus estimates are provided. First, ex-post consumer surplus 
estimates are constructed and then a lower bound for consumer surplus is computed 
using a “rational reassignment” methodology. Median consumer surplus estimates 
vary from $39 with the logistic to $143 with the lognormal, or the consumers’ share 
of surplus from 30% to 61%. Expected consumer surplus estimates indicate a high 
sensitivity to the distribution specification, especially to the tails of the distribution. 
Lower bound estimates are more solid and more reliable since they are independent 
of the tails. Accordingly, these statistics, which do not vary with distribution, yield a 
 iv
median estimate of $41 and a consumer share of 32%. Finally, the last part of this 
study examines which distribution best fits the data. Information criteria favor the 
gamma distribution, tests against the empirical distribution of second and third 
highest values prefer the logistic distribution.  
 
Keywords: Online Auctions, Consumer Surplus, Consumer Share 
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ÖZET 
 
eBay BİLGİSAYAR MONİTORÜ MARKETİNDE TÜKETİCİ FAZLASININ  
TAHMİNİ 
 
Giray, Tuğba 
 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Kevin Hasker 
 
 
Ocak 2006 
 
 
 Bu çalışmada, fiyat teklifi fonksiyonları en büyük olabilirlik kestirimi tekniği 
ile, bağımsız özel değerlerin temelindeki dağılım hakkında beş farklı varsayıma 
dayanılarak ve eBay bilgisayar monitorü açık artırmalarından 2000 yılında toplanan 
data kullanılarak tahmin edilmektedir. Bu değerlerin, sırasıyla, lojistik, gamma, 
weibull, pareto ve lognormal dağılımlarından geldiği varsayılmaktadır. Sonrasında, 
bilgisayar monitörü marketindeki tüketici fazlası tahmin edilmekte ve değişik 
dağılım tayinlerine karşı duyarlılığı test edilmektedir. İki tür tüketici fazlası tahmini 
sağlanmaktadır. İlk önce, gerçekleşen tüketici fazlası tahminleri yaratılmakta ve 
sonrasında tüketici fazlası için bir alt sınır tahmini “mantıksal yeniden atama” 
yöntemi ile hesaplanmaktadır. Medyan tüketici fazlası tahminleri lojistik dağılımla 
$39 ile lognormal dağılımla $143 arasında değişmekte, ya da başka bir deyimle, 
tüketicilerin fazladaki payı %30 ile %61 arasında kalmaktadır. Beklenen tüketici 
fazlası tahminleri dağılım tayinine, özellikle dağılımın kuyruklarına, yüksek 
hassasiyete işaret etmektedir. Alt sınır tahminleri dağılımın kuyruklarından bağımsız 
 vi
olduğu için daha sağlam ve güvenilirdir. Dolayısıyla, dağılıma göre değişmeyen bu 
istatistikler $41 medyan tüketici fazlası ve %32 tüketici payı tahminleri sunmaktadır. 
Son olarak, hangi dağılımın dataya en iyi uyduğu incelenmektedir. Bilgi kriterleri 
gamma dağılımını, ikinci ve üçüncü en yüksek değerlerin ampirik dağılımına karşı 
yapılan testler lojistik dağılımı tercih etmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnternet açık artırmaları, Tüketici Fazlası, Tüketici Payı
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this study is to estimate bidders’ private values and an exogenous 
entry process by maximum likelihood under five different assumptions about the 
underlying distribution of private values and to estimate the consumer surplus in the 
market for computer monitors using data from 2934 eBay auctions. The next chapter 
begins with a review of literature. I then desribe the data set and data collection 
techniques, present the model and likelihood functions, demonstrate the statistical 
distributions employed in the analysis and discuss the estimates of the model 
parameters. Chapter 3 forms the core of this study where I present two types of 
consumer surplus estimates, the ex-post and the lower bound consumer surplus and a 
more portable statistic, the consumer share. In chapter 4, I focus on finding the best 
parametric distribution for private values and employ two different approaches for 
this purpose. The first approach uses tests based on several well known information 
criteria to assess model fit. The second one is based on three types of tests against the 
empirical distribution of private values. The last chapter, chapter 5, concludes by 
briefly summarizing this study and its implications.  
The data set used in this study was retrieved from eBay computer monitor 
auctions. It is well known that eBay is a significant economic marketplace. It enables 
trade on a local, national and international basis. Founded in September
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1995, eBay is an online marketplace for the sale of goods and services by a diverse 
community of individuals and small businesses. Presently, the eBay community 
includes more than a hundred million registered members from around the world, 
making it the most popular shopping destination on the Internet.1 First introduced in 
1995, eBay has proved to be a  popular exchange mechanism. According to eBay 
archives, net revenues totaled $4.552 billion in 2005, which represents an increase of 
39% from the $3.271 billion reported in the full year 2004. In 2004, gross 
merchandise volume of eBay, measured by the total value of all successfully closed 
listings on eBay’s trading platforms, was $44.3 billion, representing a 30% year over 
year increase from the $34.2 billion reported in the full year 20042 . The price 
discovery power of auctions has long been accepted by economists, but the cost of 
getting bidders together prevented their widespread usage. eBay provided a solution 
to this problem by creating the environment for people to auction items over the 
internet. Due to this reason, eBay has become a significant marketplace. It is likely to 
remain so in the future as  evidenced by the economies of the marketplace. Yet, it is 
not well known how eBay benefits the economy. One measure of this benefit is the 
consumer surplus eBay generates. This study measures this important attribute in the 
market for computer monitors.  
 I estimate bidders’ values and an exogenous entry process using maximum 
likelihood. Each bidder’s valuation is an independent draw from an absolutely 
continuous distribution. Since it is not possible to be certain of the true underlying 
distribution of bidders’ values, I estimate the maximum likelihood function using 
multiple distributional assumptions. In this way, I am able to estimate consumer 
surplus under different distributional assumptions and test for sensitivity to 
                     
1http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/thecompany/companyoverview.html 
 
2
 http://investor.ebay.com/releases.cfm?FYear=2005 
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distribution. In addition, it allows me to test which distribution best fits the. The data 
set I use for this purpose consists of 2934 PC color computer monitors with a screen 
size of between 14 and 21 inches that were auctioned between February 23, 2000 and 
June 11, 2000. Hasker, et al. (2005) explain in detail the data collection and selection 
process. The data set was refined by excluding monitors that were not in working 
order, that were touch screen, LCD, Apple or Macintosh monitors since they were 
not in the same market. In addition, if bid retractions or cancellations were observed 
(which happened in 7.4 percent of the auctions), that auction was dropped from the 
data set on the grounds that bid retractions might indicate collusive behavior among 
bidders.  
 eBay  has two different auction formats. One is the “Dutch” auction which 
enables the auctioneer to sell two or more items in the same auction. In this format, 
bidders specify the number of items they want to buy and their willingness to pay for 
them. The selling price of the good is equal to the second highest bid (highest losing 
bid). Since I deal with single-item auctions, I ignore these observations. Second is 
the common auction format encountered in eBay, English auction with a hard stop 
time. This is the type of auction used in 87 percent of  the  data set and the type of 
auctions on which I focus. At the time the data set was collected, bidding went on 
from three to ten days and stopped at a preset time. This preset ending time is known 
as the hard stop time and starts at the second the auctioneer lists the item for sale and 
ends at exactly three, five, seven or ten days after its start, depending on the 
auctioneer’s duration choice.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW, DATA SET, THE MODEL AND 
ESTIMATES OF MODEL PARAMETERS 
 
 
 
 2.1 Literature Review 
 
In the literature, there not many studies which focus on the estimation of 
consumer surplus though it is an important measure of the benefit users derive from 
the marketplace. Song (2004) estimates a non-parametric model using both the 
second and third highest bids in university yearbook auctions. She constructs a new 
methodology using the second and third highest bids and estimates the median 
consumer surplus in university yearbook auctions at $25.54. In her research, the 
median price was around $22.50. This in turn implies that the median consumers’ 
share of the surplus is 53%. In comparison, I search over parametric models using 
maximum likelihood. This methodology dispenses with the need to use the third 
highest bid (which is of questionable trustworthiness) and suggests a best parametric 
model which might be applicable in other research. In another paper that measures 
consumer surplus in online auctions, Bapna, et al. (2005) use a new data collection 
technique that allows them to directly observe a bidder’s stated value. By designing a 
sniping agent that places last second bids on bidders’ behalf, they collect a large data 
set consisting of 5157 auctions. Unfortunately, this data set is very heterogenous and 
they can not estimate a structural bidding function. They compute the median
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consumer surplus in all categories at $3.53. The median sales price in their data set is 
$13.16 which in turn implies that consumers capture at least 21% of the total 
available surplus in the marketplace. Several other articles have touched on this 
subject. Carare (2001), Bapna, et al. (2003a), Bapna, et al. (2003b), Bapna, et al. 
(2004) estimate consumer surplus in multi-unit auctions. However, these papers 
primarily focus on mechanism design issues and must use ad hoc techniques since 
the equilibrium bidding function in general multi-unit auctions is unknown. Thus 
these papers are outside the scope of this study. 
 The estimation techniques used in this study are based on methods developed 
by Donald and Paarsch (1993). Unlike that paper, in this study, it is not necessary to 
estimate the minimum or maximum value a bid can take since in the auctions I 
consider, the natural lower boundary is zero and there is no reasonable binding upper 
boundary. I assume it is infinity, with extremely low probability. The data set I use 
also allows me to estimate a full likelihood function instead of a truncated one, since 
it includes all auctions where no one decided to bid.  
 There are several other methodologies currently available in the literature. 
First of all is the non-parametric technique found by Song (2004). This requires the 
use of data from the second and third highest bids to provide a non-parametric 
estimate of bidders’ value distribution. For clear theoretic reasons, one can always 
assume that the second highest bid is a bidder’s true value; the bidder decreases her 
probability of winning the auction by shading her bid and bidding her true value does 
not affect the price she will pay if she wins since the item is sold at the second 
highest bid. However, the same guarantee does not exist for the third highest bids 
since one has to rely on the bidders’ not planning  to update their bids, which they 
frequently do. This type of bidder behaviour could potentially bias the results. In 
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addition, non-parametric techniques have the problem of slow convergence. 
Furthermore, while my parametric models are more restrictive, finding the best fit is 
more informative than with non-parametric techniques. With non-parametric 
techniques, comparing distributions for different goods is diffcult, with parametric 
maximum likelihood, I can easily compare my results across different product 
categories and observe if there is some fundamental underlying distribution of 
values.  
 Another technique encountered in the literature is a Bayesian 
methodology developed in Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003). These techniques require that 
the bidding functions be linearly scalable, a restriction unnecessary with this study’s 
approach and violated by the structural form. A final technique is a Non-Linear 
Simulated Least Squares methodology developed by Laffont, et al. (1995). This 
approach overcomes the complexity of calculating the likelihood function by 
simulating the auctions, and is a flexible methodology that can be used for many 
models where revenue equivalence holds. Hasker, et al. (2005) employs this 
technique. In this study, I choose to use maximum likelihood estimation, since it is 
feasible and is the more standard approach.   
 
 
 2.2 Data Set and Collection Techniques∗ 
 
At the time the data set I use in this study was collected, eBay saved all 
information about closed auctions on their website for a month after the auction 
closed. This allows people who participated in the auction to verify the outcome, and 
provides the source of my data set. Data was collected using a “spider” program 
which periodically searches eBay for recently closed computer monitor auctions and 
                     
∗
 For a full discussion of the data set and collection techniques, please refer to Hasker, et al. (2005). 
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downloads the pages giving the item description and the bid history. Software 
development was done in Python-a multi-platform, multi-OS, object–oriented 
programming language. It is divided into three parts. It first goes to eBay’s site and 
collects the item description page and the bidding history page. It next parses the 
web, and makes a database entry for each closed auction. The final part iterates 
through the database entries stored, and creates a tab-delimited ASCII file.  
The original data processing program did not process all of the data. It 
provided the researcher with the core of the data which was augmented with further 
processing of the raw html files. Using string searches, extensive descriptive 
information for the entire data set was collected. Further data processing enabled one 
to collect all of the bidding histories.  
This program was run from February 23, 2000 to June 11, 2000 collecting 
information on approximately 9000 English auctions of computer monitors, which, 
in effect, constitute all monitors auctioned during that time period. To arrive at the 
final data set, Hasker, et al. (2005) had to drop many of these monitors because they 
are not in the same market as PC color computer monitors with a size between 14 
and 21 inches. They dropped all monitors that were not in working order, were touch 
screen monitors, LCD monitors, Apple monitors and other types of monitors that are 
bought for different purposes than the monitors in the final sample. In addition, if 
there were any bid retractions or cancellations, which was the case in 7.4% of the 
auctions, they dropped the data point. This was done because bid retractions might 
indicate collusion among bidders. Cancellations happened in a few auctions where 
the auctioneer cancelled the auction early (usually within ten to fifteen minutes of the 
beginning of the auction) causing that auction to be dropped. For the purposes of this 
study, it was necessary to further drop some of the observations in order to construct 
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measures of the competition each auction faced, resulting in 2934 auctions to be used 
in my estimations. The amount of competition a given auction faces is best reflected 
by the number of auctions which were open while it was open. Hence, it was 
necessary to drop auctions that were within ten days of a break in the data collection. 
I then counted the number of auctions, including the given auction, that were open, 
open and had the same size of monitor, or open and were in the same category. This 
resulted in three variables that measure the amount of competition an auction faces. 
Descriptive variables except for monitor size were constructed using string 
searches. Hasker, et al. (2005) detailly explain the strings that were used for each 
variable. This allowed one to collect data on whether there was a secret reservation 
price, whether it was met, monitor resolutions, dot pitch, whether a warranty was 
offered, several different brand names, whether the monitor was new, like-new, 
refurbished (the omitted category is Used), and whether it was a flat screened 
monitor. “Brand name” is used for monitors that are from one of the ten largest firms 
represented in the data set. These firms are Sony, Compaq, NEC, IBM, Hewlett 
Packard, Dell, Gateway, Viewsonic, Sun, and Hitachi in order of size. Sony has 
around a 10%  market share, the smallest are all around 3%, in total these 10 firms 
represent 57% of the market. Dot pitch (DPI) and resolution are not reported in all of 
the auctions. DPI is reported in 35% of the auctions, resolution in 58%. In the 
appendix the descriptive statistics of variables of interest are presented. 
 
 2.3 The Model and Likelihood Functions 
 I will use maximum likelihood technique to estimate bidders’ values and an 
exogenous entry process in eBay auctions. Prior to defining the model and estimation 
method in more detail, let me briefly explain the proxy bidding mechanism used in 
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eBay. Every bidder willing to participate in a given auction submits a maximum bid 
showing his current willingness to pay for the auctioned object. This bid is subject to 
change and does not necessarily reflect the true value of the bidder. The bidder can 
increase his bid if he wishes but cannot decrease it. The proxy bidding program then 
issues a proxy bid which is equal to the second highest bid plus one bid increment. 
This amount is displayed next to a current winner’s identity. This process continues 
until only one bidder is left in the auction. When the auction terminates, the winner is 
awarded the item at a price equal to the second highest bid plus one bid increment. 
There are two exceptions to this rule. In the special case where the actual number of 
bidders is one, sales price equals the open reservation price (in auctions without a 
secret reserve). The other special case occurs when the two highest bidders submit 
the same amount. In such a situation, winner is determined based on bid submisson 
time, the earlier bidder winning the auction. If ties occur, winner is determined by a 
completely randomized process. The winner pays an amount equal to his actual bid.   
 In eBay English auctions the obvious action is to enter one’s true value (or 
simply “value”) as his bid. However, frequently bidders do not do this, so to be 
certain that at least the second highest bidder does, I will follow Haile and Tamer 
(2003) by assuming that bidders’ bidding strategy satisfies the following two rules: 
1. No bidder ever bids more than he is willing to pay. 
2. No bidder allows opponents to win at a price he is willing to pay. 
Haile and Tamer (2003) show that these two assumptions imply that if ):2( Ib  is the 
second highest bid among I potential bidders, then ):2():2( IIw vbb == , where wb  and 
):2( Ib  denote the winning bid (sales price) and the second highest bid among I 
potential bidders, respectively.  
 I assume that bidders’ values are private, independent, and log-linear in a set 
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of auction specific characteristics nx (where n indicates the auction) and a private 
component jρ  (where j indicates the person). To be more explicit, bidder i’s private 
value in auction n is given by the equation:  
i
n
xi
n
nev ρβ'=
                                                                                                         (1) 
If wnb  is the winning price, nr  is the traditional open reservation price, 
i
nρ  is the 
private component of the ith potential bidder in the nth auction and I is the potential 
number of bidders who considered bidding in the auction, the formula for the 
winning bid is: 
{ }):2(' ln,lnmaxln Innnwn xrb ρβ +=                                                                              (2) 
where ):2( Inρ  is the private component of the second highest bidder in auction n. In 
other words, sales price is equal to either the open reservation price or the value of 
the second highest bidder, whichever is greater. I will allow for various models of the 
distribution of values, inv , and thus the distribution of 
w
nb  .   
 Let );( βzFn  be the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of  bidders’ private 
values at z and );( βzf n be the probability density function (pdf) – where β  may 
include some distribution specific coefficients. Let anI  be the number of active 
bidders in auction n, or the number who actually submitted bids, and for { }1,0∈i  
1=inD  if iI
a
n = , 0=
i
nD otherwise. If 
a
nII ≥  is the number of potential bidders in 
auction n, then the likelihood of auction n given I is : 
 
)|( Iln β  =  ( ) *);( 0nDInn rF β ( ) *);());(1( 11 nDInnnn rFrFI −− ββ                                
 
         
( ) 1012 );());(1();()1( nn DDwnnwnnIwnn bfbFbFII −−− −− βββ    (3)      
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In any given time, it is not possible to measure how many inactive bidders there 
might be. It is certain that there have been at least anI  bidders who have thought 
about bidding (and bid), but there may have been any number of bidders who thought 
about bidding but did not. For this reason, I will be a stochastic variable that can 
range from anI  to 
−
I - an arbitrary upper bound. 
 The potential number of bidders in an auction will be determined by a 
Poisson entry process. The parameter of the entry process, nλ , will be log-linear in a 
set of auction specific characteristics, nz , where ⊆nx  nz . Some auction 
characteristics might affect entry but not bidders’ values, but I assume that if the 
auction characteristic affects values, it must affect entry. The estimared functional 
form for entry is: 
                                        γλ 'ln nn z=                                                              (4) 
Let nT  be the length of the auction in days ( { }10,7,5,3∈nT ) and srnD  be a dummy 
which is one if there is a secret reservation price. Then the total likelihood function 
for auction n is: 
   
∑
∑
−
−
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!
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),(
              (5)                                                            
a
nI  is increased by one if there is a secret reservation price, thus I am following 
Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) in treating the auctioneer as another bidder if there is a 
secret reservation price. 
 Notice that I can use full maximum likelihood without the need for truncation 
since the data collection technique captures all auctions that do not result in sales. In 
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general, data only includes auctions that result in a sale, making this study a rare 
example of full maximum likelihood estimation in auctions. 
 The choice of 
−
I is obviously arbitrary. To derive the estimates I chose 30=
−
I  
and then tested the results when 50=
−
I . This change did not alter the coefficients, 
thus it appears the choice of 30=
−
I  is sufficient. 
 
 2.4 The Distributions  
 It is not possible to be certain a-priori what the true distribution of bidders’ 
private values is. For this reason, I test several different distributions: the logistic, 
gamma, weibull, lognormal and pareto. 
The pdf of the logistic is: 
β
βββ
'
'' 1111);(
11
n
nxnx
x
e
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e
z
n
e
eezf
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Notice that this distribution does not have a distribution specific parameter. 
The pdf of the gamma is: 
( )
β
αβ
α
α
β '
'
1
)(
1);( nx
n
e
z
x
n e
e
z
zf
−
−
Γ
=
                       (7)    
where I write { }σββ ,=  for notational simplicity. The parameter α > 0 is the shape 
parameter of this distribution and I estimate αln  to prevent this parameter from 
being negative.The pdf of the weibull is: 
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where again { }σββ ,= . The parameter α > 0 is the shape parameter of the weibull 
distribution, and αln  is estimated. The pdf of the lognormal is: 
22' 2/)(ln
2
1);( σβ
piσ
β nxzn e
z
zf −−=
                           (9)                                      
where { }σββ ,=  for simplicity of notation. The pdf of the pareto is: 
)1(
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ββ
αβ
nn xx
n
e
z
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where again { }σββ ,= , α  is the shape parameter of this distribution and αln  is 
estimated.  
 
 2.5 The Estimates 
 I first present the estimates of the exogenous values ( β
'
nxe ) and then I 
present my estimates of the parameter of the entry process (lambda). In the model, 
the right hand side variables for the exogenous values are the size of the monitor 
(diagonal screen size), the dot pitch (the distance between dots on the screen), 
resolution (the size of picture that can be seen on the monitor). In addition, there are 
a series of dummies indicating whether or not the monitor is new, like-new, or 
refurbished (the omitted category is “used”) and whether or not the monitor has a 
warranty, is a brand name, or is flat panel.  
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Table 1: Estimates of the Exogenous Value of a Monitor 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Constant -11.3159*** 
(0.000) 
-11.1785*** 
(0.000) 
-13.7639*** 
(0.000) 
-14.3522*** 
(0.001) 
-12.1096*** 
(0.006) 
Log, Size 4.6806*** 
(0.004) 
4.8012 
(0.894) 
4.7326*** 
(0.000) 
4.806*** 
(0.000) 
4.6192*** 
(0.000) 
Log, Dot Pitch -0.5418 
(0.793) 
-0.7289 
(0.500) 
-0.5844 
(0.425) 
-1.1047 
(0.563) 
-0.2101 
(0.912) 
Dummy, No Dot Pitch 0.6132 
(0.487) 
0.8606 
(0.521) 
0.6666 
(0.815) 
1.366* 
(0.055) 
0.1142 
(0.872) 
Log, Resolution 0.1409 
(0.911) 
0.1695 
(0.992) 
0.2811 
(0.168) 
0.1448 
(0.717) 
0.307 
(0.441) 
Dummy, No Resolution 1.0803 
(0.415) 
1.309 
(0.786) 
2.0814** 
(0.025) 
1.0922 
(0.107) 
2.2261*** 
(0.001) 
Dummy, New 0.2539 
(0.864) 
0.3345 
(0.907) 
0.3242 
(0.945) 
0.3939 
(0.149) 
0.3203 
(0.241) 
Dummy, Like-new 0.0877 
(0.960) 
0.2247 
(0.923) 
0.2351 
(0.802) 
0.3396 
(0.188) 
0.2425 
(0.347) 
Dummy, Refurbished 0.0594 
(0.998) 
0.0619 
(0.987) 
0.0482 
(0.998) 
0.04 
(0.965) 
0.0204 
(0.982) 
Dummy, Warranty 0.0779 
(0.935) 
0.0976 
(0.952) 
0.1033 
(0.959) 
0.189 
(0.798) 
0.1154 
(0.876) 
Dummy, Brand Name 0.016 
(0.861) 
0.0061 
(0.996) 
0.0055 
(0.997) 
0.009 
(0.990) 
-0.001 
(0.999) 
Dummy, Flat Screen 0.1979 
(0.733) 
0.246 
(0.618) 
0.2246 
(0.645) 
0.2213 
(0.592) 
0.2047 
(0.620) 
Distribution Variable+ NA -1.695 
(0.762) 
-0.6841 
(0.527) 
1.6563*** 
(0.000) 
0.7099** 
(0.022) 
Number of Auctions 2934 2934 2934 2934 2934 
-Log Likelihood/Number of Auctions 3.7939 3.7175 3.7583 3.8402 3.8441 
Note 1: + indicates standard deviation estimate for the lognormal distribution. For the weibull,  
gamma and pareto distributions, it indicates the log of the shape parameter estimate.  
Note 2: p-values are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
Note 3: * , ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
Table 1 reports the results. I first note the general stability of coefficients across 
estimates. The least stable coefficients are those for dot pitch and resolution, and 
even in these cases, the ratio of the coefficient on the variable to the dummy for that 
variable not being reported is fairly stable-generally -0.80 to -0.85 for dot pitch (with 
the exception of the pareto distribution) and 0.13 for resolution. The coefficient on 
brand name does change sign in one regression and is never significant, probably 
because brand name really conveys to the bidder that the monitor is a common brand. 
The coefficient of the diagonal screen size variable is estimated as approximately 
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five in all distributions and it is significant except for the gamma case indicating that 
buyers prefer bigger sized computer monitors.    
 While the differences in coefficients are generally small, the exogenous value 
( )β'nxe
 of a computer monitor can be very different for a given auction using the 
different techniques. In Table 2 I report the descriptive statistics of the logs of 
predicted exogenous values since the exponential function creates a skewed 
distribution and significantly biases the mean.  
Table 2: Log of Predicted Exogenous Values ( β'nx ) 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Average 3.63 4.58 2.38 1.74 3.33 
Exponential of Average $37.71 $97.51 $10.80 $5.70 $27.94 
Median 3.64 4.57 2.37 1.72 3.32 
Exponential of Median $38.09 $96.54 $10.70 $5.58 $27.66 
Standard Deviation 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.72 
Minimum 2.56 3.45 1.21 0.63 2.18 
Maximum 5.32 6.47 4.26 3.83 5.18 
 
The exponential of the average and median are in dollar terms, thus I discuss these 
variables. As the results indicate, these two estimates are almost the same for a given 
distribution but they vary widely across distributions showing that a monitor’s 
exogenous value is very sensitive to the underlying distribution of bidders’ private 
values. The gamma distribution produces the highest estimate ($98), followed by the 
pareto and the logistic which produce medium values ($28 and $38 respectively) and 
the lognormal and weibull distributions produce very low values ( $6 and $11 
respectively) 
        Next, I present the estimates of the entry process. To estimate the entry variable 
lambda, I use all variables that affect bidders’ values and other variables that only 
affect entry. The first two additional variables are the log of the seller’s feedback and 
a square term for seller’s feedback, allowing for a decreasing marginal benefit of 
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experience. In eBay, the winner and the seller can rate each other as negative, neutral 
or positive which correspond to -1, 0, 1 feedback points, respectively. A seller’s 
feedback rating is the sum of all these feedback points. Thus, feedback increases by 
one with every sale that results in a pleased customer and this variable is a measure 
for both the seller’s reputation and experience. There are also a series of category 
dummies. The default is the “general” classification but a seller is allowed to put the 
monitor into the ≤ 17″ screen, ≥19″ screen or the monotonic subcategories if he 
wishes. All monitors that are put in the monotonic sub-category are misplaced since 
all monitors in the data set I use are color monitors. In addition, there are three 
variables that capture the amount of competition a given auction faces. The variables, 
(competing auctions, all), (competing auctions, same size) and (competing auctions, 
same category) are created for this purpose. The data collection process captured 
every monitor auctioned during the sampling period which in turn enabled me to 
construct these competition variables. The first of these variables, (competing 
auctions, all), is simply the number of other auctions that were open while the 
auction was running, divided by the length of the auction. The second variable 
(competing auctions, same size), shows how many of those open auctions had a 
monitor of the same size, normalized again, by the length of the auction. The final 
variable (competing auctions, same category) is the number of open auctions in the 
same category, normalized also by the length of the auction. Table 3 reports the 
estimates. 
 An examination of the estimates reveal that they are less stable than the 
estimates of bidders’ exogenous values. However, the signs of the coefficients are 
generally stable, only in six out of twenty two variables, do I observe a sign change. 
The signs of the coefficients are, in general, consistent with my expectations. On the 
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other hand, the coefficient of the secret reservation price dummy is positive in all 
models, contrary to my expectations, but it is extremely insignificant in all 
specifications. Theoretically, the presence of a secret reservation price deters bidders 
from entering an auction  contrary to what my estimation process yields. Thinking 
that this variable may be correlated with the error term, I tried instrumenting this 
variable on all the rest and the subsets of the remainig variables and also, allowed for 
a different probability for the first bidder to arrive. Neither of these techniques have 
changed the estimates. I think the most likely reason is that secret reservation prices 
are used on items with an extremely high value. Thus entry to these auctions will be 
more and the log-linear model of entry can not capture this. In effect, even if I 
control for the effect of the secret reservation price on entry, auctions with a secret 
reservation price generally can expect 50% more bidders than auctions without a 
secret reservation price. 
 The coefficient on the open reservation price variable has a negative sign 
except for the lognormal distribution specification, where it has the wrong sign. It is 
well known that on eBay, auctioneers are not willing to raise the open reservation 
price in order not to scare bidders away. However, in all cases, this coefficient is 
highly insignificant, indicating that bidder behavior is essentially unaffected by the 
announced reservation price.  
 The coefficients on the competition variables yield interesting results. The 
coefficient on the competing auctions-all variable is consistently positive and 
significant in all distribution specifications. This implies that increasing the number 
of competing auctions increases the likelihood that a bidder will enter a given 
auction. 
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Table 3 : Estimates of the Entry Process 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Constant -15.5587*** 
(0.000) 
-13.033*** 
(0.000) 
-14.5406*** 
(0.000) 
-5.1905*** 
(0.000) 
-16.1312*** 
(0.000) 
Log, Size 3.3723*** 
(0.000) 
3.2725*** 
(0.000) 
3.4683 
(0.463) 
4.2382*** 
(0.000) 
3.8408*** 
(0.000) 
Log, Dot Pitch -5.4067 
(0.637) 
-7.2483* 
(0.080) 
-8.4491*** 
(0.006) 
-3.4813 
(0.992) 
-7.9655 
(0.981) 
Dummy, No Dot Pitch 6.5705*** 
(0.000) 
8.5044*** 
(0.000) 
10.0708*** 
(0.000) 
-3.3655*** 
(0.000) 
9.6205*** 
(0.000) 
Log, Resolution -0.8514 
(0.968) 
-1.4036* 
(0.097) 
-1.5012*** 
(0.000) 
-1.2527 
(0.316) 
-1.3859 
(0.267) 
Dummy, No Resolution -6.0989*** 
(0.000) 
-10.0171*** 
(0.000) 
-10.7186 
(0.130) 
-8.966 
(0.554) 
-9.8957 
(0.514) 
Dummy, New 7.3845 
(0.983) 
7.4000 
(0.999) 
7.5104 
(0.998) 
5.5506 
(0.990) 
7.5072 
(0.987) 
Dummy, Like-new 6.5463 
(0.979) 
6.5000 
(1.000) 
6.0767 
(0.996) 
3.0008 
(0.916) 
6.0748 
(0.831) 
Dummy, Refurbished -0.0011 
(1.000) 
-0.0205 
(0.991) 
0.0039 
(0.999) 
0.0161 
(0.986) 
0.0366 
(0.968) 
Dummy, Warranty 0.4447 
(0.573) 
0.8402 
(0.964) 
0.971 
(0.741) 
0.7463 
(0.488) 
1.0831 
(0.315) 
Dummy, Brand Name -0.0075 
(0.998) 
0.0128 
(0.999) 
0.0092 
(0.989) 
-0.006 
(0.966) 
0.0147 
(0.917) 
Dummy, Flat Screen -0.0549 
(0.967) 
-0.2003 
(0.964) 
-0.183 
(0.797) 
-0.1187 
(0.974) 
-0.2295 
(0.951) 
Log, Seller's Feedback +1 0.715 
(0.992) 
1.5201*** 
(0.002) 
1.4805*** 
(0.000) 
2.2702*** 
(0.000) 
1.7373*** 
(0.004) 
Log, (Seller's Feed Back+1)2+1 -0.3473 
(0.955) 
-0.7443*** 
(0.006) 
-0.7198*** 
(0.002) 
-1.1072** 
(0.021) 
-0.8432* 
(0.079) 
Category Dummy,  17 Screen 0.8153* 
(0.094) 
1.1007*** 
(0.001) 
0.9541 
(0.114) 
0.8032 
(0.205) 
0.7102 
(0.262) 
Category Dummy,  19 Screen 0.1085 
(0.951) 
0.2498 
(0.717) 
0.1388 
(0.897) 
-0.2512 
(0.931) 
-0.0794 
(0.978) 
Category Dummy, Monotonic -1.5328*** 
(0.002) 
-1.6876 
(0.283) 
-1.411 
(0.989) 
-0.7847 
(0.227) 
-1.1656* 
(0.073) 
Competing Auctions, All 1.2191*** 
(0.007) 
1.1813** 
(0.014) 
1.1274** 
(0.014) 
1.0966** 
(0.021) 
1.0732** 
(0.024) 
Competing Auctions, Same Size 0.2364 
(0.738) 
0.241 
(0.629) 
0.2373 
(0.914) 
0.1552 
(0.797) 
0.2319 
(0.701) 
Competing Auctions, Same Category -0.2957 
(0.886) 
-0.3409 
(0.341) 
-0.2529 
(0.317) 
-0.0674 
(0.877) 
-0.1192 
(0.785) 
Open Reservation Price -0.0754 
(0.997) 
-0.0253 
(0.983) 
-0.0199 
(0.980) 
0.005 
(0.994) 
-0.0206 
(0.976) 
Dummy, Secret Reserve 0.5861 
(0.916) 
2.2273 
(0.952) 
1.1178 
(0.152) 
1.3458 
(0.916) 
1.0856 
(0.932) 
Number of Auctions 2934 2934 2934 2934 2934 
-Log Likelihood/Number of Auctions 3.7939 3.7175 3.7583 3.8402 3.8441 
Note 1: + indicates standard deviation estimate for the lognormal distribution. For the weibull,  
gamma and pareto distributions, it indicates the log of the shape parameter estimate.  
Note 2: p-values are reported below the coefficients in parentheses. 
Note 3: * , ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
 
eBay’s market power stems from economies of marketplace, and this coefficient 
dramatically illustrates this point. The main reason why buyers prefer eBay over its 
competitors is that there are many sellers in eBay. Similarly, sellers prefer to auction 
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items using eBay because there are many buyers using eBay. Thus, I cannot be 
certain that increasing the number of auctions will decrease the number of bidders 
per auction and competition coefficients support this insight. Note that increasing the 
number of competing auctions in an item’s category decreases the number of bidders 
per auction. These effects may vanish in a current data set where the number of 
bidders per auction are much greater than they were in this study’s data’s collection 
period. It is interesting to be able to find empirical support of the theoretic reason for 
eBay’s success. 
 The dummy variable, no dot pitch, shows whether the auctioneer chose to 
report the dot pitch in his auction or not. The coefficient on this variable is positive 
except for the lognormal specification. For the rest of the four specifications, not 
reporting dot pitch increases entry for a given auction. However, in the lognormal 
specification, I see that not reporting dot pitch deters entry. Except for the lognormal 
case, the ratio of  the coefficient on the dot pitch variable to that on the dummy 
variable for not reporting dot pitch is stable and takes values around -0.85. Similarly, 
the ratio of the coefficient on the resolution variable to that on the dummy variable 
for not reporting resolution is stable in all five cases, and takes a value around 0.14. 
In Table 1 one sees that increasing an item’s resolution increases its value to bidders. 
However, it seems to adversely affect the entry process, and lower the expected 
number of bidders. This indicates that some heterogeneity exists among bidders. A 
high resolution means that, for a given screen size, it is possible to see a larger 
picture or page of text. This also means that the details of the picture or the text size 
are smaller, and it is reasonable to conclude that some bidders do not want to pay 
more for such a monitor. My  results indicate that some bidders do not value 
resolution and thus are not willing to bid on items with a high resolution. By looking 
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at the coefficient estimates on the dummy variable for flat screen monitors in tables 1 
and 3, I see that the same tendency exists (though to a lesser degree) in flat screen 
monitors; although a flat screen increases a monitor’s value, due to the heterogeneity 
in bidders’ preferences, entry is adversely affected by flat screen monitors. While a 
flat screen is a positive aspect, not everyone will be willing to pay more for it, and 
this has a small negative effect on entry and a small positive impact on the item’s 
value. Analysis of the coefficients on the variables, refurbished and brand name, 
yield somewhat similar results, though this result is dependent on distribution 
specification. A monitor’s being refurbished slightly improves its value in all five 
specifications, but its impact on entry is specification dependent. Likewise, a 
monitor’s being a brand name monitor slightly increases its value in all five 
specifications, except for the pareto case. Its impact on bidder entry process is, again, 
specification dependent. 
 Analysis of the coefficients on the two seller’s feedback-related variables 
displayed in Table 3 helps one assess the impact of the seller’s reputation and 
experience on the potential number of bidders. The coefficient on the log of seller’s 
feedback is significant and positive in all specifications except the logistic. The 
coefficient on the log of seller’s feedback square captures the marginal impact of 
increasing feedback rating on the entry process. This coefficient is consistently 
negative in all specifications, indicating a diminishing marginal impact of increasing 
feedback. These coefficients deserve special attention, since there are two reasons 
that we should expect a significant and positive impact for feedback. First reason is 
that more experienced auctioneers know more about setting up auctions; they use 
clearer item descriptions, use pictures, etcetera. These things encourage bidders to 
enter the auction. Second is that these coefficients in a way reflect bidders not 
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trusting a seller who has a lot of negative feedback. Indeed, Cabral and Hortaçsu 
(2004) follow auctioneers over time and find that one negative feedback can decrease 
the growth rate of an auctioneer’s sales from 7% to -7%. 
 While the estimated model of entry varies dramatically across regressions, the 
expected number of bidders varies less than the exogenous values do. Again, I report 
the descriptive statistics of the log of the entry parameter lambda, since the 
exponential function introduces a significant right skewness to the distribution. Table 
4 displays the results. 
Table 4: Predicted Values for the Log of Entry Parameter 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Average 2.01 2.86 2.63 5.04 2.49 
Exponential of Ave. 7.5 17.46 13.9 154.5 12.1 
Median 1.28 1.93 1.82 2.32 1.7 
Exponential of Med. 3.6 6.89 6.2 10.2 5.5 
Standard Deviation 2.33 2.66 2.51 4.52 2.48 
Minimum -0.94 -0.92 -1.03 -1.07 -1.29 
Maximum 11.46 13.74 12.87 18.00 12.70 
 
Comparing the average and the median values, one sees that they are significantly 
different from each other, indicating to a right skewness in the distribution of 
lambda. Hence, it is more reliable to interpret the median. For the gamma, weibull 
and pareto distributions, the estimates of lambda are essentially the same. The 
median number of bidders per day is around 6-7. However, the logistic and 
lognormal results deviate from this pattern. Logistic reveals a low estimate, 3-4 
bidders per day, whereas the lognormal yields a high estimate, around 10 bidders per 
day. Since I use a Poisson entry process to model entry, lambda is equal to the 
expected number of bidders per time period, per one day based on my data set. Thus, 
in a three day auction, the median number of bidders is estimated to vary between 10 
and 30, in a ten day auction, between 35 and 100. Even the most conservative 
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estimates suggest that there is a large number of potential bidders for each computer 
monitor, once again providing empirical evidence for the popularity of eBay auction 
market. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
CONSUMER SURPLUS AND CONSUMER SHARE 
 
 3.1 Consumer Surplus 
 
 Today internet auctions provide a popular means of transaction for numerous 
buyers and sellers. One important issue about internet auctions is the amount of 
consumer surplus that buyers derive from them. If this amount is low bidders can 
easily switch to other methods of transaction given the competing markets. In this 
section, I attempt to measure this consumer surplus given the various distributional 
specifications.  
 The ex-post consumer surplus is the difference between the winner’s value of 
the item being auctioned and what she actually paid for it. While the a-priori 
consumer surplus, the surplus a bidder expects before entering the aution, is a 
function of the potential number of bidders, I, the ex-post consumer surplus is not 
and therefore estimating ex-post consumer surplus is relatively straightforward. This 
is in part because I do not have to calculate a summation over the possible values of 
the potential number of bidders.  
 One point is important and needs to be clarified at this stage. After an auction 
closes, eBay lists the complete bid history with the exception being the actual 
amount submitted by the winning bidder. This information is never disclosed, neither 
during nor after the auction. Since I can not observe the highest bidder’s valuation in 
an auction, I have to estimate it given the winning bid. For this purpose, I calculate 
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the conditional expectation of the highest bidder’s valuation given the second highest 
bid. Due to the theoretical reasons pointed out in section 3,  I fail to reject that the 
winning bid (sales price) is the second highest bidder’s value of the goood. (I assume 
that the bid increment in eBay is zero). From this discussion it follows that the ex-
post consumer surplus in auction n is : 
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Based on this foundation, I can estimate ex-post consumer surplus. Summary 
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statistics for estimates of consumer surplus for the various distributions I consider are 
reported in Table 5. 
Table 5: Expected Consumer Surplus 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Average $90.29 $89.40 $106.64 $194.81 $160.08 
Median $38.68 $68.32 $82.69 $142.95 $114.08 
Standard Deviation $1,582.60 $72.35 $89.01 $177.66 $151.32 
Minimum $13.51 $7.94 $7.38 $7.66 $9.61 
Maximum $68,068.00 $473.21 $544.27 $1,461.20 $1,472.90 
 
It is evident from these estimates that expected consumer surplus is affected by the 
underlying distribution of bidders’ private values. There is a wide variation in these 
estimates across distrinutions. In my data set, median selling price for a computer 
monitor is $100. Thus, these estimates are high. Comparing average and median 
consumer surplus values, one sees that average is always greater than the median, 
indicating a significant right skewness. For this reason, using the median estimates 
for interpretation is more reliable. The logistic produces the lowest estimate, whereas 
the lognormal yields the highest. The gamma produces the next lowest estimate after 
the logistic. Notice that their averages are nearly the same. Pareto, following the 
lognormal, produces the second highest estimate. It is important to note that these 
two distributions are the worst fitting ones. 
 
 3.2 Consumer Share 
 An alternative and more portable way of presenting these statistics, instead of 
finding the absolute consumer surplus, is reporting the consumer’s share of the 
surplus. If bv  is the buyer’s value and av  the auctioneer’s value, then this statistic is 
ab
w
nb
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−
−
, or in terms of consumer surplus it is, 
a
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n
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. Unfortunately, it is 
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not possible to accurately estimate av  from the data. For this reason, I assume that, 
0=av  which gives me a lower bound. These estimates are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6:  Expected Consumer Surplus Share 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Average 0.339 0.455 0.492 0.624 0.573 
Median 0.303 0.435 0.475 0.614 0.559 
Standard Deviation 0.149 0.119 0.098 0.059 0.058 
Minimum 0.087 0.097 0.195 0.445 0.499 
Maximum 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 
Expected consumer share estimates gives one information about how much of the 
total available consumer surplus bidders are capturing. Despite the fact that there are 
many bidders per computer monitor auction, consumers are still receiving between 
one third and two thirds of the generated surplus. 
 
 3.3 Lower Bound Estimates 
 Considering the high expected consumer surplus estimates and their wide 
variation among distributions, I decided to construct a “lower bound” for the true 
consumer surplus. This statistic will enable me to check the sensitivity of my 
estimates to the tails of my distributions since it is independent of the distributional 
assumptions. If the actual number of  bidders, I, was constant among auctions, then 
assuming that wn
I
n
I
n bvv ==
):2():1(
 in every auction would provide me with a strict lower 
bound on the distribution of private values. Since I is random in my auctions, this 
estimate does not give me a true lower bound. However, it is still useful in the sense 
that it enables me to reconstruct my estimates using its empirical distribution and 
produces estimates that are independent of the tails of the distribution. Table 7 
displays the estimates.   
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Table 7: Lower Bound Estimates of Consumer Surplus 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Average $61.29 $61.50 $61.75 $61.28 $61.68 
Median $41.38 $40.88 $41.02 $40.08 $41.64 
Standard Deviation $53.10 $54.92 $53.55 $53.19 $53.22 
Minimum $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Maximum $1,022.30 $1,043.00 $931.86 $730.20 $925.59 
 
These lower bound estimates of consumer surplus are more stable across 
distributions than those in Table 5 and are also comparable given the median sales 
price of $100. In addition, these estimates are not correlated with the exogenous 
value of a computer monitor, β
'
nxe . In a similar fashion, lower bound estimates for 
consumer’s share of surplus are computed and are reported in Table 8. 
Table 8: Lower Bound Estimates for Consumer Share 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Average 0.374 0.369 0.371 0.367 0.373 
Median 0.318 0.314 0.315 0.311 0.319 
Standard Deviation 0.169 0.167 0.167 0.164 0.165 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
These estimates yield that consumers capture approximately 32% of the surplus 
generated in an auction. Accepting that lower bound estimates yield the worst case, 
consumers are still capturing nearly 32% of the surplus in an auction. Therefore, both 
the expected and the lower bound estimates reveal that consumers capture a 
significant portion of the consumer surplus. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
FINDING THE BEST DISTRIBUTION 
 
 I made five different, parametric distributional assumptions for the underlying 
distribution of bidders’ private values. It is essential to detect which one best fits the 
data. For this purpose, I will employ two different approaches. Firstly, I will carry 
out tests based on the log-likelihood. Akaike (1973) proposes selecting the model 
that minimizes an information criterion based on the likelihood. Other analysts have 
suggested other information criteria since that time, and I will compare several of 
them. In addition, McFadden (1974) provides an analog to the 2R  in a conventional 
regression, the likelihood ratio index (LRI), sometimes also called the pseudo 2R , 
given by, 
0ln
ln1
L
LLRI −=  
where lnL is the log-likelihood function with all the model parameters from the 
model and 0ln L  is the log-likelihood function only including a constant term. As 
with the measure of 2R , this index is bounded between 0 and 1. If all the slope 
coefficients are zero, then it equals zero, indicating that none of the explanatory 
variables is indeed useful.3 The LRI increases as the fit of the model improves. 
                     
3
 For a more detailed discussion, the interested reader is referred to Greene (2003). 
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Secondly, I will do tests against the empirical distribution of the second and third 
highest values. For this purpose, I will take a subset of my data that is not used in 
estimation and see whether the distirbution of this subset is close to the empirical 
distribution. I do this by finding the probability of each observation and the 
distribution of these probabilities should be uniform by construction. I have two 
different data sets that I can use for this approach. First I did not use half of my data 
so that I could have variables stating the amount of competition each auction faced. 
Notice that the data collection program sampled the entire population of monitors in 
eBay’s records, but in order to know how much competition an auction faces I must 
know how many auctions closed during a given auction. This led me to drop a 
significant subset of my data, a subset which I can use now. I can also use a 
technique that Song (2004) used in her estimation methodology. While one can not 
trust all third highest bids to reflect the true value of the third highest bidder, one can 
trust a subset of them, and I can use this subset to test whether my assumed 
distribution is close to the empirical distribution. 
 
 4.1 Tests Based on the Log Likelihood 
 Since I have multiple distributional assumptions it is important that I find the 
best fitting one for my data set. To this end, I will employ several  information 
criteria, which are all very similar given my models. These criteria were intended to 
compare models which are very different in the number of parameters or observed 
variables. These numbers are nearly constant across my different models. Hence, the 
tests simplify to checking which distributional assumption yields the largest 
likelihood value, or similarly, which one yields the smallest negative log-likelihood 
divided by the number of observations, the objective function I use in my estimation.  
 30 
The first information criterion I employ is the Akaike Information Criterion: 
k
N
L
N
AIC 1),(log1 +−=
∧∧
γβ                                                                                  (13) 
where N is the sample size, ),(
∧∧
γβL  is the log-likelihood, and k is the number of 
parameters. Another criterion that puts more of a penalty on complexity is the 
Bayesian Information Criterion or the Schwartz Criterion: 
k
N
NL
N
BIC
2
)log(),(log1 +−=
∧∧
γβ                                                                          (14) 
The final information criterion is the Browne-Cudeck Criterion which is given by the 
equation:  
k
pN
L
N
BCC
2
1),(log1
−−
+−=
∧∧
γβ                (15)            
where p is the number of observed variables. Given that N = 2934, p = 21 and 
{ }35,34∈k , the difference in these statistics is small. 
 
Table 9: Results of the Tests Based on Likelihood 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
AIC 3.806 3.729 3.770 3.852 3.856 
BIC 3.840 3.765 3.806 3.889 3.892 
BCC 3.806 3.720 3.770 3.852 3.856 
Obj.Function 3.794 3.718 3.758 3.840 3.884 
LRI 0.303 0.123 0.126 0.115 0.130 
 
According to AIC, BIC, BCC and objective function values, the gamma specification 
provides the best fit. It is followed by the weibull, logistic, lognormal and pareto 
distributions. However, the statistics do not vary widely among distributions. The 
gamma specification provides a slight improvement over other specifications, 1.1% 
over the weibull, 2% over the logistic, 3.2% over the lognormal and 4.3% over the 
pareto. These percentage improvements are subject to change if the same 
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calculations are to be done with the likelihood values instead of the log-likelihood. 
On the other hand, LRI values yield a different result. The logistic specification, 
which has the highest pseudo 2R  value, provides the best fit according to this 
statistic. In light of the above discussion, two distributions prove to be the best-fitting 
ones, the Gamma and the Logistic. I seek further evidence to this result in the next 
section where I carry out tests against the empirical distribution of values.  
 
 4.2 Tests Against the Empirical Distribution of Values 
 In order to test whether my data comes from the empirical distribution of 
values I need samples that I did not use in my estimation. One possible source for 
this is the data I dropped so that I could measure the amount of competition an 
auction faced. Another source is the third highest bids in the auctions used in 
estimation. Since these sources are heterogenous and each is open to some criticism I 
construct tests using both. 
 In the sample of dropped auctions there are 3608 data points. My sample of 
third highest bids is drawn from my data for estimation so I have 2934 data points. I 
first drop all auctions where there are not two or three bidders (losing 1505 and 1408 
data points respectively). Next I must drop auctions where there was a secret 
reservation price because this secret reservation price could be the true second 
highest or third highest bid and is unobserved. This costs me a further 517 and 479 
data points respectively. For both data sets I have to do some further work and then I 
can find the probability of my observations. 
 
  
 
 32 
 4.2.1 An Out of Sample Second Highest Values Test 
 After dropping the observations mentioned previously I am left with 1586 
auctions out of the 3608 not used in estimation. In order to use these auctions, I have 
to impute the values of three variables: competing auctions,all; competing auctions, 
same size; and competing auctions, same category. For all of these variables I take 
the straightforward approach of taking the appropriate average over the auctions used 
in estimation (before normalizing by the auction length). This assumes that the 
market was not growing much over time. This assumption is harmless since my data 
set was collected within a three month window. 
 Theory states that the winning bid is also the value of the second highest 
bidder if there are at least two bidders who bid above the reservation price. Given I, 
the potential number of bidders, the cdf of the second highest order statistic is: 
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this variable should be uniformly distributed by construction. The resulting 
distributions are compared to the uniform distribution (with parameters 0 and1) both 
by visual inspection using graphs and employing goodness-of-fit test procedures. 
Figure 1 displays the results. 
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Figure 1 : Probabilities of Out of Sample 2nd Highest Bids vs U(0,1) 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, all five distributions have too many high values and all 
of them except the logistic seem to come from approximately the same distribution. 
The logistic is evidently much closer to the uniform than the rest of the distributions. 
Still, it is clear that these distributions are not uniform. 
 Visual inspection is reinforced by the results of the goodness-of-fit tests I 
carried out. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov, the Kuiper, Cramer-von Mises, Watson, and 
Anderson-Darling tests constitute the tests I use. All of these statistics should be zero 
if the null of the probabilities being uniform is true, and the reported statistics are 
adjusted for the size of the data set. For a full discussion of these test statistics, the 
interested reader is referred to D’Agostino and Stephens (1986).  
 The logistic has the lowest outcomes among all distributions. However, I fail 
to conclude that any of the distributions come from the uniform by inspecting the 
values of the statistics which are far from being zero. The results of these tests are 
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displayed in Table 10. 
Table 10 : Comparing Probabilities of Second Highest Bids to Uniform 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Kolmogorov 5.679 11.410 11.754 12.850 11.971 
Kuiper 6.016 12.535 12.459 13.621 12.460 
Cramer-von Mises 13.044 52.943 57.489 66.546 59.646 
Watson 2.886 16.175 16.736 19.840 16.876 
Anderson-Darling 63.822 243.294 263.040 303.727 273.823 
 
 I was not overly surprised when my structural model did not fit the data. My  
model is too parsimonious to be able to capture all the aspects of the real world. 
Relaxing structural assumptions like the assumption about the distribution of private 
values will always result in a better fit. Given the size of my data set for these tests 
this better fit results in a rejection of my parsimonious model. Non-parametric 
methods can always improve on structural methods. On the other hand, I was able to 
use full maximum likelihood estimation with my data set and make clearer 
statements using a maximum likelihood technique. In addition, my goal with this 
analysis is to find the best parsimonious structural model for bidders’ private values. 
Thus I am more interested in which of these distributions best fits the empirical 
distribution. I find that the logistic distribution fits the underlying data generating 
process the best. Given that the log-likelihood is only 2% higher than that of the 
gamma, this makes logistic a viable alternative. 
 
 4.2.2 A Third Highest Values Test 
 I can also use the third highest bid data to construct the same test. However, I 
encounter a different problem here. Third highest bids may not be the true value of 
the third highest bidder. If both higher bidders bid before the third highest bidder can 
update his bid, then he may decide not to raise his bid. To illustrate, assume that a 
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bidder’s true value is $100, but his first bid is $25. If two bidders then 
simultaneously bid $150, then the price in the auction will rise to $150, and the 
bidder who bid in the first place will not find it worhwhile to raise his bid to his true 
value, $100. On eBay, one frequently observes multiple bidding behaviour by a 
single bidder, which causes this sort of problem. 
 Due to the hard stop time on eBay, I know that this sort of problem can not be 
true for all bidders. If, for example, the third highest bid is submitted with only  a 
few seconds left in the auction, a rational bidder should bid his true value, since the 
probability that he can update his bid is approximately zero. One can be fairly sure 
that the bids submitted in the last few minutes almost certainly reflect bidders’ true 
values. When I compare the distribution of these bids to earlier periods, I find that I 
cannot reject that bids as early as ten hours from the end of the auction are from the 
same distribution with last minute bids, leaving me with 621 data points for my 
analysis. I have constructed two-sample  Kolmogorov Smirnov tests for subsets of 
this data set and always arrived at the same conclusion. As an illustration, consider 
the following discussion. In order to check whether the 621 data points belong to the 
same distribution, I split this data set into two; bids submitted in the last 120 minutes 
window and the rest of the bids submitted in the late 10-hour window. I use two 
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test to check whether these two halves 
belong to the same distribution. Table 11 reports the results. 
Table 11 : Test for the Equality of Distribution within 3rd Highest Bids 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Pareto Lognormal 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.150 0.860 0.982 0.943 0.948 
P-value 0.142 0.451 0.290 0.336 0.329 
 
My test results show that I fail to reject, for each specification, both halves of my 
data set come from the same distribution. Consequently, I can use all these 621 data 
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points to check whether their mapped values come from the uniform distribution.  
 Similar to the analysis done in the previous part, I use graphical analysis and 
goodness-of-fit tests to check whether my mapped values of third highest bids come 
from the uniform distribution. Given I, the potential number of bidders, the cdf of the 
third highest bid is: 
∫ −
−
=
−
3
0
233 );());(1();(
!2)!3(
!)|;( nb nnInnn dzzfzFzFI
IIbG ββββ (18)             
where  3nb  is the third highest bid in auction n. I then integrate over I: 
∑
∑
−
−
=
−
=
−
=
I
i
T
i
nn
I
Ii nn
T
i
nn
nn
nn
a
n
nn
e
i
T
IbGe
i
T
bG
3
3
3
!
)(
)|;(
!
)(
),;(
λ
λ
λ
βλ
γβ
                                (19)                            
and the resulting distribution of probabilities  should be uniform. In Figure 2 I plot 
these probabilities against the uniform distribution. Here there are two distributions 
that are very close to the uniform, and which I accept depends on which test statistic 
I look at. Clearly the logistic dominates the gamma, weibull, and lognormal, but the 
pareto is not dominated. Notice that the probabilities from the pareto distribution 
have changed dramatically. Table 12 reports the test statistics. 
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Figure 2 : Probabilities of 3rd Highest Bids vs U(0,1) 
 
Table12: Comparing Probabilities of Third Highest Bids to Uniform 
 
 Logistic Gamma Weibull Lognormal Pareto 
Kolmogorov 4.011 11.022 10.723 11.771 3.273 
Kuiper 4.064 11.054 10.781 11.849 4.213 
Cramer-von Mises 6.818 55.624 52.465 61.338 2.837 
Watson 1.323 10.942 10.589 13.507 1.757 
Anderson-Darling 33.402 289.968 274.861 320.447 33.841 
 
For every test statistic either the pareto or the logistic is always the lowest. In 
general, the difference between the tests can be understood from their functional 
form. For example note that the pareto crosses the uniform distribution while the 
logistic does not. This explains why the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (based on the largest 
absolute deviation) prefers the pareto while the Kuiper (which punishes for both 
positive and negative deviations) prefers the logistic. However the clear overall 
statement is that based on this test both the pareto and the logistic are equally good. 
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 4.3 Comparing the Distribution of Second Highest and Third 
 Highest Bids  
 The difference in results between the probabilities of the second and third 
highest bids for the pareto raises an interesting issue. If a given distributional 
specification is correct, then at least the second and third highest values should come 
from the same distribution, which in turn, indicates to the fact that the model is 
internally consistent. Is it reasonable to accept that the distribution of the second and 
third highest bids are the same? If it is, this adds support to the non-parametric 
techniques employed by Song (2004). On the other hand, if it is not, then this raises 
questions about whether the third highest bid data is trustworthy. Once again, I will  
employ two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to check the equivalence between 
second and third highest bid distributions. Table 13 reports the results. 
Table 13 : Comparing the Distributions of the 2nd and 3rd Highest Bids 
 
 Gamma Weibull Logistic Lognormal Pareto 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 4.982 4.718 0.961 6.225 6.960 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.000 
 
The results are quite interesting. For all the distributions except the logistic, I clearly 
reject that second and third highest bids’ distributions are the same. However, in the 
logistic case, I fail to reject that they are from the same distribution. In conclusion, 
the logistic specification for bidder’s private value distribution offers a model which 
is internally consistent even though it does not fit the underlying private value 
distribution exactly. In comparison, pareto distribution fails even to be internally 
consistent, let alone fitting the data generating process exactly. Therefore, the logistic 
specification offers the best parametric approximation to bidders’ values based on 
tests against the empirical distribution of second and third highest values. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study, using data from computer monitor auctions in eBay, I estimate 
bidders’ values and an exogenous entry process by maximum likelihood using five 
different assumptions about the underlying distribution of private values, estimate 
consumer surplus in computer monitor market and test the sensitivity of this statistic 
to distributional assumptions. The data set I use consists of 2934 PC color computer 
monitors with a screen size of between 14 and 21 inches which were auctioned 
between February 23, 2000 and June 11, 2000. I use maximum likelihood estimation 
and am able to estimate a full likelihood function instead of a truncated one since my 
data set includes all auctions where no one decided to bid. I assume that bidders’ 
values are private, independent, and log-linear in a set of auction specific 
characteristics and a private component that is individual-specific. The data 
collection technique allows me to know the actual number of bidders in a given 
auction. However, this number may be very different from the potential number of 
bidders, those who thought about bidding but did not. Thus, I take the potential 
number of bidders, I, as a stochastic variable that can range from the actual number 
of bidders to an arbitrary upper bound. Potential number of bidders in an auction is 
modeled by a Poisson entry process where the parameter of the entry process is again 
log-linear in a set of auction specific characteristics. I state that some auction 
characteristics might affect entry but not values but I assume that if an auction 
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characteristic affects values, then it must affect entry. I construct the total likelihood 
function by incorporating the enrty process to the function and increase the actual 
number of bidders in an auction by one if there is a secret reservation price. Thus the 
approach I follow takes after Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) in treating the auctioneer as 
an additional bidder if there is a secret reservation price. I impose five distributional 
assumptions on bidders’ private values and use the logistic, gamma, weibull, 
lognormal and pareto distributions. I then present the estimates of the exogenous 
values. I find that while the differences in coefficients are small, the exogenous value 
of a computer monitor can be very different for a given auction using different 
distributions. Since the exponential function creates a skewed distribution and 
significantly biases the mean, I report the descriptive statistics of the logs. 
Consequently, the gamma distribution produces the highest estimate ($98), followed 
by logistic ($38), pareto ($28), weibull ($11) and lognormal ($6) distributions. In the 
estimates of the entry process I include all variables that affect bidders’ values and 
other variables that only affect entry. I assume that sellers’ feedback related 
variables, variables showing the computer monitor’s category, competition variables, 
the open reservation price and the presence of a secret reservation price only affect 
the entry process. I end up with less stable coefficient estimates than the estimates of 
bidders’ exogenous values, though the signs are consistent with my expectations. I 
encounter only one surprising result and see that secret reservation price increases 
entry to an auction contrary to theory. However, this coefficient is insignificant and I 
think the most likely reason for its positive value is that secret reservation prices are 
used on items with an extremely high value, thus there will be more entry and the 
log-linear model of entry cannot capture this. In the open reservation price case I find 
that bidder behaviour is essentially unaffected by the announced reservation price. 
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Competition variables reveal interesting results. I find that increasing the number of 
competing auctions increases the likelihood that a bidder will enter a given auction, 
illustrating the economies of the marketplace that is the basis of  eBay’s market 
power. I also find that increasing the number of competing auctions in an item’s 
category decreases the number of bidders per auction. Regarding computer monitor 
related variables, I find that a high resolution  raises an item’s value but seems to 
lower the expected number of bidders, indicating some heterogeneity among bidders; 
while a high resolution is clearly a positive aspect, not everyone will be willing to 
pay  more for it. The same tendency, though to a lesser degree is seen in flat screen, 
refurbished and brand name monitors, though the effect is distribution dependent. As 
a final issue, I find that in all regressions except the logistic, a high sellers’ feedback 
induces entry to an auction and increasing sellers’ feedback, which indicates more 
experience in eBay, has a diminishing marginal impact on the entry process. Next, I 
demonstrate consumer surplus and consumer share estimates. These estimates are 
sensitive to the underlying distribution, and vary from $38 with the logistic to $143 
with the lognormal, or the consumers’ share of surplus is 30% to 61%. Consumer 
share estimates always reveal that consumers are receiving a large share of the 
surplus. Even in the worst case, explained by the lower bound consumer surplus 
estimates which do not vary with distribution, consumers capture 32% of the surplus. 
Lower bound estimates need to be emphasized at this point. The main reason why 
consumer surplus estimates vary widely across distributions is that this statistic is 
highly affected by the tails of the distribution. Lower bound estimates , on the other 
hand, are independent of the tails and thus, are stable across distributions 
(approximately $ 41 under all distributional assumptions).  
 In the last chapter, I try to find the best parametric distribution for bidders’ 
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private values as evidenced by the data set. I take two approaches towards this goal. 
First, I use information criteria as a basis for model selection. Secondly, I take a 
subset of the data that is not used in estimation and see whether the distribution of 
this subset is close to the empirical distribution. My analysis show that either the 
gamma or the logistic provides the best fit for the data, depending on whether the 
researcher prefers information criteria, or the LRI together with the results of the 
tests against the empirical distribution of values, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
 
 Average Median Standard Deviation Skewness Maximum Minimum 
Sales Price 135.70 100.00 132.85 2.01 1430.00 0.01 
Open Reservation Price 75.65 35.00 106.37 2.56 1100.00 0.01 
Number of Bidders 3.92 3.00 4.06 1.06 22.00 0.00 
The Length of the 
Auction 
5.08 5.00 2.16 0.65 10.00 3.00 
Size 16.92 17.00 2.39 0.42 21.00 14.00 
Dot Pitch+ 0.26 0.26 0.02 -0.70 0.31 0.20 
Dummy, Dot Pitch Not 
Reported 
0.64 1.00 0.48 -0.56 1.00 0.00 
Resolution+ 1116.24 1024.00 271.05 0.32 1600.00 640.00 
Dummy, Resolution 
Not Reported 
0.38 0.00 0.49 0.49 1.00 0.00 
Dummy, New Monitor 0.07 0.00 0.26 3.31 1.00 0.00 
Dummy, "Like-New" 
Monitor 
0.03 0.00 0.17 5.38 1.00 0.00 
Dummy, Refurbished 
Monitor 
0.13 0.00 0.33 2.23 1.00 0.00 
Dummy, Warranty on 
Monitor 
0.03 0.00 0.17 5.51 1.00 0.00 
Dummy, Brand Name 
Monitor 
0.59 1.00 0.49 -0.36 1.00 0.00 
Dummy, Flat Screen 
Monitor 
0.18 0.00 0.38 1.71 1.00 0.00 
Seller's Feedback 207.99 108.00 382.49 4.35 4343.00 1.00 
Dummy, Item sold in 
<=17'' size Screen 
Category 
0.62 1.00 0.49 -0.50 1.00 0.00 
Dummy, Item sold in 
>=19'' size Screen 
Category 
0.27 0.00 0.45 1.02 1.00 0.00 
Dummy, Item sold in 
Monotonic Category 
0.00 0.00 0.05 22.06 1.00 0.00 
Competing Auctions, 
all 
924.33 906.00 116.55 0.90 1322.00 705.00 
Competing Auctions, 
Same Size 
182.01 191.00 68.77 -0.06 357.00 3.00 
Competing Auctions, 
Same Category 
435.06 496.00 189.87 -0.35 903.00 3.00 
Dummy, if there was a 
Secret Reservation 
Price 
0.18 0.00 0.38 1.68 1.00 0.00 
Note: +Statistics for these variables are only for items where a value was reported 
 
